U.S. Policy Toward Political Islam
Stephen Zunes, Foreign Policy in Focus
September 12, 2001
The perceived growth of radical Islamic movements throughout the Middle
East and beyond has not only caused major political upheaval in the
countries directly affected but has placed political Islam at the
forefront of concerns voiced by U.S. policymakers. One unfortunate aspect
of this newfound attention has been the way it has strengthened ugly
stereotypes of Muslims already prevalent in the West. This occurs despite
the existence of moderate Islamic segments and secular movements that are
at least as influential as radicals in the political life of Islamic
countries.
Even though the vast majority of the world's Muslims oppose terrorism,
religious intolerance, and the oppression of women, these remain the most
prevalent images of the Muslim faith throughout the Western world. Such
popular misconceptions about Islam and Islamic movements—often
exacerbated by the media, popular culture, and government officials—have
made it particularly difficult to challenge U.S. policy.
To be able to respond effectively to Islamic militancy, the U.S. must
clearly understand the reasons why a small but dangerous minority of
Muslims have embraced extremist ideologies and violent tactics. These
movements are often rooted in legitimate grievances voiced by
underrepresented and oppressed segments of the population, particularly
the poor. And the U.S. is increasingly identified with the political,
social, and economic forces that are responsible for their misery. Many
Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere are exposed not to the positive
aspects of U.S. society -- such as individual liberty, the rule of law,
and economic prosperity -- but to the worst traits of American culture,
including materialism, militarism, and racism.
Although scientific and other advances from the Muslim world helped
Europe emerge from the Dark Ages, the West has generally viewed Islamic
peoples with hostility. From the time of the Crusades through the
European colonial era to the ongoing bombing and sanctions against Iraq,
Western Christians have killed far more Muslims than the reverse. Given
this strong sense of history among Muslims, Washington's use and threat
of military force, its imposition of punitive sanctions, and its support
of oppressive governments result in a popular reaction that often takes
the form of religious extremism.
When a people have lost their identity -- whether it be due to foreign
occupation, war-induced relocation, the collapse of traditional
economies, or other reasons -- there is a great pull to embrace something
that can provide the structure, worldview, and purpose through which to
rebuild their lives. The mosque is one of the few constants in Muslim
countries undergoing great social disruption. Islam is a faith that
offers a clear sense of social justice, a feeling of empowerment, and an
obligation by individuals to challenge those who cause the injustice.
Although there has been a decidedly reactionary orientation to some
Islamic movements, other currents within Islam have been clearly
progressive.
Washington has used the threat of Islamic fundamentalism as a
justification for keeping a high military, economic, and political
profile in the Middle East. Yet it has often supported Muslim hard-liners
when they were perceived to enhance U.S. interests, as they did in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.
Often, extremist Islamic movements arise in direct response to U.S.
policies. The 1953 overthrow by the CIA of the moderate constitutional
government of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, followed by years of support
for the brutal regime of the shah, led directly to the rise of the
Islamic revolution in that country. U.S. support for the regime of Jafaar
Nimeiry during most of his repressive 16-year rule of Sudan led to the
destruction of much of that country's civil society, resulting in the
1989 coup by hard-line Islamist military officers who overthrew that
country's brief democratic experiment. During the 1970s and 1980s, the
destruction of moderate Muslim-led factions in Lebanon by U.S.-backed
invasions and occupations from Syria and Israel—and later military
intervention by the U.S. itself—led to a vacuum filled by more sectarian
groups such as Hezbollah, even as most of the other militias that once
carved up the rest of the country were disarmed by a revived central
government and its Syrian backers.
The roots of Islamic radicalism stem from economic inequality, military
occupation, and authoritarianism. Given that U.S. policy in the Middle
East and elsewhere has often perpetuated such injustices, responsibility
for the rise of radical Islamic movements can often be traced to the U.S.
itself.
Problems with Current U.S. Policy
The U.S. has supported hardline Islamic movements and governments, such
as the Saudi Arabia regime, which have encouraged extremist movements
elsewhere. U.S. support for repressive governments makes democratic and
nonviolent options for the Islamic opposition extremely difficult.
Neoliberal economic development strategie -- vigorously encouraged by the
U.S. -- have resulted in widespread economic dislocation, which has in
turn encouraged the growth of radical Islamic movements.
Ironically, the U.S. has at times been a supporter of hardline Islamic
movements and governments. For example, Washington armed extremist
Islamic groups in Afghanistan during the 1980s during the popular
uprising against that country's communist regime backed by Soviet
occupation forces. Some of the most notorious Islamic terrorists today --
including many followers of Osama Bin Laden -- originally received their
training from the CIA during that period.
Despite horrific reports from Afghanistan about the Taliban government's
totalitarian theocracy, which has far surpassed the brutality of the
communist regime of the 1980s, the U.S. voiced little opposition to the
regime until it refused to extradite Bin Laden for trial on terrorism
charges.
Currently, the U.S. maintains close strategic cooperation -- including
massive arms transfers, training and logistics, and a permanent military
presence -- with Saudi Arabia, one of the most extreme states in the
Muslim world considering its strict interpretation of Islamic codes,
repression of women, and political orientation. The Saudis have used
their vast oil wealth to encourage like-minded movements throughout the
Islamic world. Some of the Islamic-identified governments and movements
the U.S. has found most troubling—the Hamas of Palestine, the Taliban of
Afghanistan, the FIS of Algeria, and the military government of Sudan—all
had backing from the Saudis at some point in their development.
Perhaps the most serious problem with U.S. policy has been Washington's
support for repressive allied governments that suppress even moderate
Islamic opposition groups. This often leads to a backlash against any
U.S. presence by Islamists reacting to American support of what they
perceive as an illegitimate government. The U.S. has rationalized its
support for several regimes engaging in patterns of gross and systematic
human rights violations as a regrettable but necessary means of
suppressing an Islamic opposition that Washington fears would be even
worse if it came to power. In many respects, this policy closely
parallels the decades of support during the cold war of repressive
right-wing governments in the name of anticommunism. The result is
similar: the lack of open political expression encourages suppressed
sectors to ally with an underground—and often violent and
authoritarian—opposition movement.
In some cases -- such as in Tajikistan and other former Soviet republics
-- the U.S. has even allied with old-line Communist Party bosses as a
means of countering the growth of Islamic movements. This occurs despite
the fact that the Islamic movements in much of Central Asia are actually
quite progressive and moderate (in part because of the strong Sufi
influence) when compared with some of their Middle Eastern and North
African counterparts.
Another factor fueling radical Islamic movements has been the perceived
U.S. culpability in the deaths of Muslim civilians. From Washington's
initial failure to respond to the Serbian slaughter of Bosnian Muslims to
the sanctions against Iraq to the support of Israeli repression against
Palestinian and Lebanese civilians, U.S. foreign policy has laid itself
open to this accusation.
Extremist Islamic political forces have also arisen in areas where there
has been large-scale dislocation due to war. U.S. support for Israel's
ongoing occupation and repression in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has
contributed to the rise of Hamas and other radical Islamic movements,
despite the fact that Palestinians historically had been more pluralistic
and tolerant than many of their Arab neighbors. Islamic extremists were
never much of a factor in Lebanese politics until after the U.S.-backed
1982 Israeli invasion and Israel's 22-year occupation of southern
Lebanon.
Social dislocation can also result from uneven economic development, as
has been encouraged by the U.S. insistence on globalization according to
a neoliberal economic model. Largely unregulated Western economic
penetration in Egypt, Tunisia, the Philippines, and elsewhere has
exacerbated gross wealth inequalities and triggered disruptive internal
migration, giving rise to these countries' Islamic extremists.
It would certainly be simplistic to blame the U.S. exclusively for the
rise of violent and extremist Islamic political movements. Autocratic and
misguided socialist policies in Algeria -- which has had very little U.S.
influence -- also resulted in an Islamic reaction similar to movements
triggered by autocratic and misguided capitalist policies elsewhere. And
in other countries, the colonial legacies of the French and British along
with certain domestic factors have spawned extremist Islamic groups. Yet
U.S. policies have unquestionably fueled the development of this
dangerous political trend.
Military solutions -- apparently preferred by the U.S. and many of its
allies -- will not succeed in countering the rise of militant Islamic
movements. Nevertheless, Washington has successfully encouraged the NATO
alliance, in a desperate attempt to justify its existence at the end of
the cold war, to place challenging Islamic movements among its top
strategic priorities. NATO has already begun a dialogue with some North
African regimes regarding mutual security arrangements against a
perceived Islamic threat.
Over the past two decades, the U.S. has bombed Lebanon, Iran, Sudan, and
Afghanistan in an effort to challenge Islamic movements and governments
viewed as antithetical to U.S. interests. Such air strikes have not only
been contrary to international law but have also resulted in fueling
anti-American hatred, particularly when they have caused civilian
casualties.
Trying to impose military solutions to what are essentially political,
economic, and social problems is doomed to fail.
Toward a New Foreign Policy
The U.S. must shift from supporting repressive governments to encouraging
greater democracy and pluralism in the Islamic world. The U.S. must
demand an end to Israel's illegal occupation of Arab East Jerusalem and
other Palestinian territories and promote a peace agreement that
recognizes the city's importance to all three monotheistic faiths. The
U.S. should support sustainable economic development in the Islamic
world, so that the benefits of foreign investment and globalization can
be more fairly distributed with minimal social disruption.
To effectively challenge the threat from radical Islamic movements, the
U.S. must shift its focus from trying to crush such movements to pursuing
policies that discourage their emergence. Similarly, the U.S. must
recognize that not all Islamic movements are contrary to the development
of political pluralism or good relations with the United States.
From Afghanistan to Algeria and beyond, radical Islamic movements have
grown to prominence where there has been great social dislocation in the
population, whether it be from war or misguided economic policies.
Policies designed to minimize such traumatic events will be far more
successful than military threats in encouraging moderation in Islamic
countries.
The U.S. must cease its support for autocratic regimes and encourage
greater political pluralism. In countries like Jordan, Turkey, and Yemen,
where Islamic parties have been allowed to compete in a relatively open
political process, they have generally played a responsible -- if
somewhat conservative -- role in the political system. The more radical
elements observable in many Islamic movements are usually a reflection of
the denial of their right to participate in political discourse. Many
radical Islamic movements, such as those in Egypt, Palestine, and
Algeria, include diverse elements. Were they no longer under siege and
instead allowed to function in an open democratic system they would
likely divide into competing political parties ranging across the
ideological spectrum.
It is noteworthy that the FIS in Algeria competed fairly and nonviolently
during that country's brief political opening in the early 1990s, only to
have its anticipated election victory stolen in a military coup. In the
aftermath, the radical GAM emerged to launch its campaign of terror
against foreigners and broad segments of Algerian society.
Indeed, no extremist Islamic movements have ever evolved in democratic
societies. Supporting democracy would therefore be a major step in the
direction of moderating political Islam. The U.S. must stop considering
Islam to be the enemy and instead encourage Islamic movements by working
for justice and economic equality.
Washington must support the Palestinians' right to statehood in the West
Bank and Gaza, including a shared Jerusalem that would serve as the
capital of both Israel and Palestine. Both Congress and the executive
branch should rescind resolutions and past statements that imply support
for Israel's unilateral annexation of Arab East Jerusalem and surrounding
Palestinian lands. Washington must instead recognize the city's
importance to all three monotheistic faiths. Not only would such a policy
shift bring the U.S. in line with international law, UN Security Council
resolutions, and virtually the entire international community, but it
would also remove a highly emotional and volatile issue from the arsenal
of Islamic extremists, who exploit the widespread anger about U.S.
support for the illegal Israeli occupation of a city that Muslims also
see as holy.
The U.S. should stop pushing for radical economic liberalization in
Islamic countries, since such policies increase inequality and result in
rising materialism and conspicuous consumption for elites at the expense
of basic needs of the poor majority. Instead, the U.S. must support
sustainable economic development, so that the benefits of foreign
investment and globalization can be more fairly distributed with minimal
social disruption. Although some Islamic traditions have proven to be
relatively tolerant of autocratic governance, the presence of corruption
and a lack of concern about social injustice by a country's leadership
are generally seen by Muslims as a violation of a social contract and
must be resisted.
In many respects, political Islam has filled a vacuum that resulted from
the failure of Arab nationalism, Marxism, and other ideologies to free
Islamic countries both from unjust political, social, and economic
systems and from Western imperialism. Just because radical Islamic
movements have embraced tactics and ideologies reprehensible to most
Westerners does not mean that the concerns giving rise to such movements
are without merit.
Only by addressing the legitimate grievances of these movements will
there be any hope of stopping their often illegitimate methods and
questionable ideologies. Otherwise, the U.S. may find itself dealing with
a series of conflicts that could eclipse the bloody surrogate cold war
battles that ravaged the third world in previous decades.
Stephen Zunes is an associate professor of politics and chairperson of
the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco.
Zunes is also a senior analyst and the Middle East and North Africa
editor at Foreign Policy In Focus.
This article was originally published in the June 2001 issue of Foreign
Policy in Focus.
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